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WAR DEPARTMENT :: OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

# CAVALRY NOTES

*Turkey*

PREPARED BY

MAJ. HENRY T. ALLEN

GENERAL STAFF



WASHINGTON  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

1911



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TO BE FORWARDED TO THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE SENATE

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MAJ. HENRY T. ALLEN

CENTRAL STATE

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1911

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## **CAVALRY NOTES.**

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### **IMPORTANCE OF LARGER CAVALRY POSTS.**

Since the Civil War officers of Cavalry have rarely had an opportunity of seeing a division, or even a brigade, of Cavalry in operation in our country. In fact, until recently whole regiments assembled have been comparatively rare and we have largely become habituated to thinking of a regiment as a very large aggregation of mounted men. It is certainly time to seriously consider the question of combining organizations so as to maintain at suitable posts brigades of Cavalry that may at times be combined with other brigades to make divisions.

The proper handling of Cavalry brigades and divisions would naturally reveal defects in a system wherein a regiment constitutes the largest aggregation. It would show the importance of greater compactness in the smaller units and the corresponding necessity of a greater readiness to strike in all units.

### **REGIMENTS OF FEWER BUT LARGER UNITS.**

The first requisite to efficiency of Cavalry is a proper command for the captain—a force that will be sufficient to deliver a real blow after all the usual details are deducted; the second requisite is a compact combination of these units possessing a maximum of sabers that can be expeditiously handled as a regiment by one man. By the latter it must be understood that the one man (the colonel) must be able to handle his entire command, not in two or three lines (brigade formation), nor as three semi-independent commands (squadrons), but as a solid unit possessing the greatest mobility. This does not imply that he will not require field officer assistance in the execution of various movements, in command of parts of the regiment when detached, as well as administrative supervision of certain parts of the regiment in garrison.



It has been demonstrated and conceded that the limit of sabers thus handled is between 650 and 950 and that the corresponding limit for captains is between 125 and 160. A major would therefore have, say, 300 or more sabers. In the skillful manipulation of the units thus composed double rank formations are a necessity. This means not only shortened fronts and shortened depths, but a permanent readiness to utilize what is universally conceded to be the best charging formation—lines in double rank.

As long as our troop units consist of only 60 troopers there can be no question of double rank without a combination of at least two of them into one.

The readiness with which our drill lends itself to double-rank formations and the striking similarity of our formations to those of practically all other nations are indeed remarkable. The distinguishing differences between our formations and those of other countries are largely due to the necessity of making the best possible showing with our extremely small troop units. With them we must have single rank, and we must at battle exercises, as a rule, employ a road column (fours) instead of a proper maneuvering column (platoons). It is therefore easy to see that with a regiment of 12 small units in single rank and the whole divided into three semi-independent commands the advantages as to compactness and the readiness to deliver a quick blow with the whole must be lost. If we were to consider our Cavalry solely in relation to its use in Indian warfare, there would be less reason to advocate greater cohesion, greater striking power, and greater facilities for dismounted fighting in compact formations, the whole being kept well in the hands of the regimental commander.

### **STRIKING SIMILARITY OF CAVALRY FORMATIONS EVERYWHERE.**

The formations of the leading Cavalries of the world are practically identical with each other and, interesting to state, are in principle the same as those of our squadron except that we use only single rank and columns of fours more than they do.

These formations are the route columns (generally twos and fours), platoon and troop columns, mass, line of platoon columns, and double column of platoons. The regiments vary from



four to six troops, inclusive, and each troop (captain's command) is divided into four platoons having ordinarily a front of three to five sets of fours. Each of these regiments is handled like our squadron, and it therefore makes no difference in principle in maneuvering them whether the regiments consist of two, three, four, five, or six troops. This drill simplicity is of great importance in fitting Cavalry commands (both officers and men) for their greatest utility on the field of battle.

If we compare a Cavalry regiment of six troops each of three platoons of four sets of fours (or four platoons of three sets of fours, say 96 men in ranks in each troop), all in double rank, with a regiment possessing the same number of sabers (700), all formed in single rank and divided into three semi-independent commands, possibly in two lines, it is evident that in general one command will need only about half the maneuvering area required by the other.

There has been some talk of a model regiment, organized as at present, with 100 men per troop. If 80 per cent of these men could be turned out and put into single ranks it would make a command so unwieldy that only extraordinary men could properly handle it as a regiment. Neither voice nor trumpet could reach its extreme limits even when not deployed as skirmishers, and it would ordinarily be necessary to delegate part of the command as a second line after the manner of brigade command.

If our Cavalry were always to operate on the field of battle in single regiments, or less, and we were to completely ignore formations of brigades, divisions, and corps, there might be some cause for continually resorting to two lines in our regimental drill. Even in as small a command as a brigade of two regiments there would be at least one regiment not put in two lines. Beyond the great tactical advantages of compactness and mobility there are yet weightier ones that require careful consideration—economy as to finances and economy as to detachment away from purely military duty. The proportion of detached troopers from small units is far greater than from large ones, and the housing and stabling of 12-unit regiments is relatively much greater than the housing and stabling of 6-unit regiments having the same number of troopers.

No idea of uniformity nor of competition with infantry should be considered. Cavalry should be rated on its own lines as to organization and equipment, and should in general be reckoned as a useful, vigorous auxiliary of infantry whether in inde-



pendent organizations or as divisional Cavalry. A regiment of fewer units is far more fit for divisional assignment than is the present organization, and in cases of detachment involves the regiment in fewer fractions.

In these days when economy is the watchword, and when officers with troops are handling but a fraction of the men commensurate with their grades, it is advisable to approach the subject of Cavalry organization in a businesslike way and to carefully inquire whether we are properly preparing for war.

### VALUE OF CIVIL WAR EXPERIENCES.

The Cavalry experiences of our Rebellion should be instructive to us as they have been to other countries; likewise, the experiences of other countries in long warfare should be instructive to us as they have been to each other. They largely learned fighting on foot from us, and are apparently going further in that direction than we proposed. This is shown by the lengthy consideration devoted to that subject in their drill regulations and by the fact that three of them have bayonets on their carbines and a fourth has provided its carbines for the use of bayonets, if after further trials it be considered advisable to adopt them. They have not seen fit to adopt our small units in single ranks. Doubtless after due trials all of us may find some wisdom in the almost universal large troops in double rank.

The following data should cause us to suspect something wrong in the numerous small units of our Civil War organization, which remains unchanged to this day:

"In 1863 there were in the Army of the Potomac 36 regiments (Cavalry), whose effective strength varied during the six months from May to October between 10,000 and 14,000 men. This body of Cavalry required in—

	Remounts.
May-----	5, 763
June-----	6, 327
July-----	4, 716
August-----	5, 499
September-----	5, 829
October-----	7, 336

"This is equivalent to a loss of two and one-half horses per man, or a rate of five horses per annum."



These facts indicate that the quintessence of Cavalry lore and good practice is not always found in the system pursued during the Rebellion.

The report of the Secretary of War, in referring to the above, stated:

"If a similar state of affairs existed through all our Cavalry, its 223 regiments would require 435,000 horses annually."

If we assume the average total strength of the 36 regiments for the six months in question to be 12,000, then the total per regiment is 333. Making the necessary deductions for details and noncommissioned officers, there remained troops in single rank with five to six sets of fours. The regiments of Sheridan's command in his Richmond campaign averaged about 250 troopers each.

### DRILL REGULATIONS.


The following, taken from the latest drill regulations of other countries, show, as stated above, the great similarity of their organizations and their maneuvering formations to each other, and to those of our troops and squadron.

FRANCE.—The troop is composed of four platoons and is moved and maneuvered habitually in column of platoons. For attack it is formed in line. In line the four platoons are placed side by side without intervals. The captain, followed by a trumpeter, is half a troop front in advance of the center of his troop and serves as its guide. The second captain is 3 meters in rear of the center.

The regiment is composed of four troops; two troops form a half regiment. If the regiment is composed of an uneven number of troops, it is, nevertheless, divided into two half regiments. The troop can be reduced to three and even to two platoons. The regiment should be exercised in troops of 64 files; it can also be maneuvered in one rank. The colonel is the guide of the regiment. The base troop follows him. A place is assigned to the colonel in the different formations, but he is, nevertheless, privileged to go where he thinks necessary. He can be momentarily replaced as guide by the lieutenant colonel, or can indicate the direction and gait to the captain commanding the base force. The lieutenant colonel is habitually within reach of the colonel.




The regiment is formed and maneuvered in column of platoons, in double column, in column of troops, in mass, in line




Mass.

of platoon columns, and in line. The column of platoons, by reason of its narrow front and the advantages which it possesses of easily crossing varied terrain is the formation of march when



Line of platoon columns.

large distances are to be covered. The facility with which it can profit by slight undulations of the ground make it specially fitted for the formation of approach, but in marching directly



Regiment in line.

toward the enemy this formation is not advisable because of the time required to deploy it.

The double column is intermediary between the column of platoons and the mass. It is a formation of approach favorable




for maneuvering, for use in echelons, and for action by half regiments. It can be deployed rapidly to the front or in a single line to either flank.

The column of troops is used only as a transitory formation, which special circumstances require. This formation is useful in reviews and parades.

The mass permits of placing troops in a narrow space, while preserving sufficient independence for facility in marching. It can be employed in the formation of assembly or approach, but on condition that it be not exposed to artillery fire. It is the most vulnerable of all regimental formations and ought to be absolutely prohibited under fire.

The line of platoon columns, the deployment of which to the front is almost instantaneous, is, by reason of its large intervals, fitted for movements over varied terrain in the phase which immediately precedes a direct attack. In case of surprise it offers successful troop echelons on its flanks.

The line is the formation for attack. Its wings must be protected. It does not lend itself to maneuvers like formations in column or echelon, but it offers less vulnerability to artillery fire than deep formations




GERMANY.—The troop is formed in two ranks, first and second, and in four platoons; the platoon in groups; the groups in files. In columns of fours there is no distance between the sets of fours.


The regiment consists of three to five troops. The drill regulations find application even in formations of two troops. The regimental commander is ordinarily about 60 steps in front of or in the middle of his regiment. The other field officer is about a half horse length to the rear and three steps to the right of the regimental commander. The formations are as shown in the plates:

1. Line.

2. Line of platoon columns. (troop columns).



Regiment in line.



Line of platoon columns.

NOTE.—Intervals between columns = 3 platoon fronts + 6 paces.




3. Double column of platoons.
4. Mass (regimental column).
5. Column of platoons (platoon column).



Double column of platoons.

NOTE.—Distance between troops = platoon distance + 6 paces.



Mass.



30° →


Column of platoons.

NOTE.—Distance between troops = platoon distance + 6 paces.

AUSTRIA.—The troop is formed and maneuvered in line or column. It is divided into four platoons. In line the ranks are separated by a distance of two steps. When the troop is divided, its commander retains command of the stronger part. When the parts are equal he takes command of the part which is to have the more important duty. Provisions are made for fighting on foot by having one holder for each 16 horses, by dismounting in line and by dismounting in column of fours.

In dismounting the odd numbers of front rank move forward the length of a horse, the even numbers of second rank rein back an equal distance.

*The regiment.*—The troops in the “division” (half regiment) and the latter in the regiment are tactically independent bodies, both of which have fixed places in the primary formation.



Regiment in line.

An independent “division” is formed and maneuvered according to the principles of the regiment.


The regiment is formed and maneuvered in line, line of platoon columns (column-line) mass, column of platoons (the column) and double column of platoons (double column).

The interval between troops in line is 10 steps. Troops have fixed places at formation, but are not required to maintain them in maneuvers.

The line permits the simultaneous use of the greatest number of sabers in the attack and at the same time diminishes the losses from frontal fire of the enemy.




In line of platoon columns the interval is three platoon fronts plus 10 steps. This formation finds rapid deployment to the front and makes easy movements in broad front on difficult terrain.



Line of platoon columns.

NOTE.—Intervals = 3 platoon fronts + 10 paces.


Mass is simply the line of platoon columns with intervals of 10 steps. This formation finds application when the regiment is to be maneuvered in a limited space or beyond the reach of effective fire.



Mass.

In column of platoons the distance is platoon front plus 10 yards. This formation is employed in long movements because it is easily adapted to difficult terrain and can easily profit by slight cover. It permits formation of line in all directions and is specially favorable for deployment toward the flanks.






In the double column, the columns are separated by intervals of 10 steps. The "division" is called the first, the other the second division. The double column is occasionally formed from a "division" and in an analogous way to that from the regiment. In comparison with the column, the double column has the advantage of less length and consequently a quicker deployment to the front.

The regimental commander in general supervises the troop commanders. He should not assume charge of details of the maneuvers, but only the leading and conduct of the troop commanders should be kept in view. He is not tied to any fixed place; yet, when he takes over the leading, he is 30 steps in front of the commander of the base troop, who maintains that distance.

The commander of an independent "division" conducts himself like a regimental commander. In the regiment he supervises the correct leading of the troops under him without either leading or commanding. Exceptional cases in which "division" commanders command are given in their proper




### Double column of platoons.



places. When these troops are in line they are in a line with the regimental commander. They communicate, when necessary, the commands of the regimental commander to their troops. The regimental commander gives them special orders or duties, for example: To take charge of the reserve, to ride with him for consultation with reference to maneuvering, etc.

RUSSIA.—The troop is drawn up from right to left and is divided into four platoons—two half troops. The first and second platoons constitute the first half troop and the third and fourth platoons the second half. As in other countries, when faced to the rear the rear rank becomes the front rank.

The regiment consists of four or six troops, the latter having permanent numbers assigned them. The plate shows the position of all concerned in line. The intervals between troops is one platoon. For convenience in supervising his command the




Regiment in line.


regimental commander goes where his orders can be heard, and where he can best observe the execution of the movement. Field officers are required to look after the correct execution of formations and movements and the prevention and correction of mistakes. When the regiment is divided, for example, in movements by successive stages when there is more than one troop involved, or when the part of the regiment larger than one troops is ordered away, field officers take command over these parts in accordance with instructions from the commandant. The commanders of troops may move to those places whence their commands can be best heard. The regiment is divided into the following columns:

1. Route column.
2. Column of platoons (regimental platoon column).
3. Double column of platoons.

4. Mass (reserve column).
5. Column of troops (troop column).
6. Line of platoon columns.



Double column of platoons.



Mass.

Column of platoons

7 paces.




The columns may be formed to the right, to the left, and not in the order of the number of troops. The plates show these formations.



Column of troops.

NOTE.—Distance between troops = 1 platoon front + 7 paces.



Line of platoon columns.

NOTE.—Interval between troops = 4 platoon fronts.



## EXPERIMENTS WITH PROVISIONAL REGIMENTS.

The end of the first day's experiments with the Eleventh Cavalry, at Leon Springs, Tex., showed that our captains could, with very little experience, handle troops in double rank with 48 double files. The troops were divided into four platoons each of 12-trooper fronts.

The second day's experiments in troop drill was made with troops of 128 men in ranks, divided into four platoons of 16-trooper fronts. This drill demonstrated that, with little practice, it would be easily handled and on about half the area required in single rank. As it is not believed that our troops will soon be able to put as many troopers in line as 128, subsequent experiments were made with 96 men in double rank. There was a question as to whether with that number three platoons of 16-trooper fronts is not better than four platoons of 12-trooper fronts.

A special advantage of the 16-trooper front is the facility with which columns of sections (eights) may be formed. Though not much practiced by other countries, that formation seems to possess a decided value.

In the earlier experiments with the two provisional regiments of the Eleventh Cavalry too much stress was laid upon the separation of the regiments into squadrons, thereby continuing the brigade idea that permeates our regimental organization and its maneuvering.

In the last experiments at Leon Springs (latter part of July) only one provisional regiment was formed, and stress was laid upon the importance of handling it in a compact form as a single regimental entity.

It was formed of six troops in double rank. Each troop had 48 files in rank formed by consolidating two troops so that each of the latter had half of its men in front and half in rear rank. In dismounting in double rank two ways were employed: 1. Odd numbers of front rank move forward, even numbers of rear rank reined back. 2. All except even numbers of rear rank moved forward.

The distance between ranks was ordinarily 2 yards (though 1 yard was used by some troop commanders), and the intervals and distances of platoons and troops were maintained in accordance with the principles of our squadron drill. The column of fours was practically eliminated as a maneuver



formation, it being replaced by the column of platoons. The colonel was assisted by the lieutenant colonel, and the two majors exercised supervision over their respective half regiments throughout the drills, taking command of such detached parts as the colonel directed. But throughout every effort was made to eliminate the idea of the separate, semi-independent squadrons with their special distances and intervals. The result was that the regiment of 650 or more troopers was continually maneuvered over areas less than half those that would be required by the same number of sabers in our present organization, and its elements were always in proper formation for charging. The troopers were dismounted to fight on foot with great frequency, and numerous charges were made in double ranks with fractions of the regiment, all of which were highly satisfactory. It was generally conceded that the lead horses in column of eights (formed by moving the platoons or troops by the flank) were more tractable than the usual column of fours. That is explained by the assistance that the adjacent fours give each other. Still the horses could be led away in columns of fours if woods or other obstacles made it necessary. The regiment was deployed as skirmishers, leaving a troop behind each flank as reserves; it was maneuvered at all gaits in all formations, and was at different times commanded by a colonel, two lieutenant colonels, and two majors.

After a few days' experiments there was no longer any question of the great facility with which this regiment could be dismounted to fight on foot and quickly afterwards mounted. Moreover, it was clear that a greater number of men could be put at a given point in shorter time, either mounted or on foot, than with the single-rank formation. It was suggested during the experiments that the regiment of six troops was too large for a single command.

It is not believed that all officers will be readily convinced of the numerous advantages to be gained by any new organization, nor was it possible to develop all the little details that the change entailed; still, it is believed that further trials will continually win advocates for it, and that a board in connection with a good regiment could, within a comparatively short time, draw up new regulations or change our old squadron regulations so as to meet all requirements. The experiments were wholly confirmatory of some of the recommendations made in the past by higher authorities. Possibly the favorable results



achieved in such a short time in the double-rank formations, which were new to all, were due to the remarkably well-trained regiment with which we were experimenting.

It is believed that no advantage can be claimed for our present Cavalry organization that can not be claimed for one wherein the regimental units are fewer, larger, and more nearly equal in peace numbers to war numbers; for one wherein there is always a command suitable for striking and which can be compactly handled to that end.

Finally, and in brief, it may be stated that our present Cavalry regiment is faulty in principle and unnecessarily expensive in administration, both as to men and money; that our Cavalry system or policy leaves us wholly ignorant of the practical operations of Cavalry except in its minor rôles, such as patrols and scouts, advance and rear guards, etc.

It is therefore recommended that further trials be made, with a view to fixing upon the details of a regiment of much fewer and much stronger units (one of which will be a reserve or depot one), and that Cavalry be assembled at posts or camps in brigades and divisions with the Cavalry auxiliary, horse artillery, as early as practicable, in order that experience and instruction in the broader rôles of Cavalry service may be attainable by all officers concerned.

## CREATION OF PRESENT CAVALRY ORGANIZATION.

The question naturally arises as to why our present organization was adopted. Perhaps the general orders cited below will explain the query, and they will show that it was not at all a result of war experience as ordinarily believed, but rather a desire to have "the system of Infantry Tactics prepared by Bvt. Maj. Gen. E. Upton, United States Army, adopted as the system for the armies of the United States in the place of all others."

In the Cavalry Tactics (Cooke's), 1861, the first paragraph of the book stated that "the companies will be designated as squadrons." The regiment consisted of 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant colonel, 2 majors, and 10 squadrons. There was only one battalion included in these regulations, which continued in force until 1873, 13 years after the war began.

In the new Cavalry Tactics (1873) prepared by two field artillerymen and two cavalrymen the names "company," "bat-



talion," and "regiment" were adopted for the Cavalry. Under these drill regulations it would be possible to have a regiment of four battalions each of seven companies, although the normal was three battalions of four companies each. From that it may be seen that the Cavalry anticipated the Infantry in the three battalion organization (that of the Infantry being adopted in 1891), and in the great effort at assimilation practically a Cavalry brigade organization was adopted.

In fact, the same Tactics (1873) provided as follows:

"All the rules for the evolutions of the regiment are applicable to the brigade."

General Orders,  
No. 73.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
*Washington, August 1, 1867.*

The following order received from the War Department is published for the information and guidance of the Army:

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington City, August 1, 1867.*

ORDER IN RELATION TO UPTON'S INFANTRY TACTICS.

The new system of Infantry Tactics, prepared by Bvt. Maj. Gen. Emory Upton, United States Army, recommended for adoption in the place of all others, by a board of officers, of which Gen. Grant is president, having been approved, is adopted for the instruction of the Infantry of the Army of the United States, and for the observance of the militia of the United States.

To insure uniformity throughout the Army, all Infantry exercises and maneuvers not embraced in that system are prohibited, and those therein prescribed will be strictly observed.

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

By command of Gen. Grant:

E. D. TOWNSEND,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*



Extract from the proceedings of a board of officers which convened at West Point, N. Y., by virtue of the following orders, viz:

Special Orders.  
No. 300.

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
Washington, June 11, 1867.

A board will assemble at West Point, N. Y., on Tuesday, the 9th day of July, 1867, to take into consideration the system of Infantry Tactics prepared by Bvt. Maj. Gen. E. Upton, United States Army, and will report its opinion whether the said tactics should be adopted as the system for the armies of the United States in lieu of all others. The board will be composed as follows: Gen. U. S. Grant, United States Army; Maj. Gen. G. G. Meade, United States Army; Bvt. Maj. Gen. E. R. S. Canby, United States Army; Bvt. Maj. Gen. W. F. Barry, colonel Second United States Artillery; Bvt. Brig. Gen. W. N. Grier, colonel Third United States Cavalry; Bvt. Col. H. M. Black, major, Seventh United States Infantry.

By order of the Secretary of War.

(Signed) E. D. TOWNSEND,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

\* \* \* \* \*

The general advantages of the new system are:

1. Its easy application to all the arms of the service, leaving nothing additional to any special branch except the manual of the arm with which it fights, the adaptation of the words of command, the training of animals, and the management and care of the material with which it is equipped.

2. The readiness with which the principles may be acquired by new troops, abbreviating materially the time required to fit them for the field, and practically extending the effective term of service of the soldier. This is of great importance in relation to the volunteer force, of which in all great wars our armies must be largely composed.

The special advantages are:

That it dispenses with the maneuvering by the rear rank, by inversion, and the countermarch, and substitutes therefor rapid and simple conversions of front, and changes from column into line.

That it increases the number of modes of passing from the order in column to the order in line, facing in any direction;



diminishes the time required for these changes, and preserves always the front rank in front—advantages of vital importance in the presence and under the fire of the enemy.

That it provides for all column movements required in an open country and by the column of fours, for the movements necessary in narrow roads, wooded or obstructed countries, without the extension incident to ordinary movements by the flank.

That it provides for a single rank formation, specially adapted to the use of breechloaders.

That it provides for a system of skirmishing, from double or single rank, superior for offense or defense to any existing system.

The board, therefore, recommend that the system of Infantry Tactics prepared by Bvt. Maj. Gen. E. Upton, United States Army, be adopted as the system for the Armies of the United States in the place of all others.

(Signed) U. S. GRANT, *General.*

(Signed) GEO. G. MEADE,  
*Major General, U. S. Army.*

(Signed) ED. R. S. CANBY,  
*Brigadier and Brevet Major General.*

(Signed) WILLIAM F. BARRY,  
*Colonel Second Artillery,*  
*Brevet Major General, U. S. Army.*

(Signed) WM. N. GRIER,  
*Colonel Third United States Cavalry,*  
*Brevet Brigadier General, U. S. Army.*

(Signed) H. M. BLACK,  
*Major Seventh United States Infantry,*  
*Brevet Colonel, U. S. Army.*

Approved and referred to The Adjutant General.

August 1, 1867.

(Signed) E. M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

A true extract from official report.

HORACE PORTER,  
*Brevet Brigadier General and Aid-de-Camp.*



General Orders,  
No. 6.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, July 17, 1873.*

The following order, received from the War Department, is published for the information and guidance of the Army:

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington City, July 17, 1873.*

The revision of Upton's Infantry Tactics by the author, and the Tactics for Artillery and Cavalry (including the proceedings of the board—Maj. Gen. Schofield, president—instituted by General Orders, No. 60, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant General's Office, series of 1869), assimilated to the Tactics for Infantry, pursuant to instructions from the General of the Army, by Lieut. Col. Emory Upton, First Artillery, instructor of tactics, United States Military Academy; Capt. Henry A. Du Pont, Fifth Artillery, commanding Battery F, Fifth Artillery; Capt. John E. Tourtelotte, Seventh Cavalry, colonel, and aid de camp to the General; Capt. Alfred E. Bates, Second Cavalry, assistant instructor of Cavalry tactics, United States Military Academy, having been approved by the President, are adopted for the instruction of the Army and Militia of the United States.

To insure uniformity, all exercises, evolutions, and ceremonies not embraced in these Tactics are prohibited, and those therein prescribed will be strictly observed.

WM. W. BELKNAP,  
*Secretary of War.*

By command of Gen. Sherman.

WILLIAM D. WHIPPLE,  
*Assistant Adjutant General.*

## OUTLINES OF A SIX-TROOP CAVALRY REGIMENT.

If the cavalry peace strength were fixed at 16,800 enlisted (approximately 4,000 above present authorized strength) and the regiment at 700 sabers, there would be 24 regiments each of 6 fighting troops of about 110 men, 1 reserve troop, 4 field officers, 10 captains, 14 first lieutenants, and 8 second lieutenants. That would be an increase of 9 colonels, 9 lieutenant colonels, 3 majors, 15 captains, 111 first lieutenants, and a loss of 33 second lieutenants.

Following the same organization and utilizing the present authorized strength, very slightly increased, there would be 20



regiments as above. That would give an increase of 5 colonels, 5 lieutenant colonels, a loss of 5 majors, and a net loss of 35 company officers (25 captains lost, 55 first lieutenants gained, 65 second lieutenants lost).

The drill regulations of the several countries cited above do not show their respective totals of regimental field officers, some of whom are with depot or reserve troops. In this suggested plan the ratio of field officers to company officers is as 1 to 8 (in present organization 1 to 9), whereas the average of other cavalries is as 1 to 7.2. The ratio of captains to lieutenants remains practically as at present, that is, 1 captain to 2 lieutenants.

Perhaps it would be advisable to make the troops a little larger than 110 men, in order that at formations each troop might have a front of 48 troopers (3 platoons of 16 double files or 4 platoons of 12 double files). In war the troop strength should be set so as to give a troop front of 64 troopers. These tentative plans are cited to show in a general way what could be effected under a six-troop organization, what would be the possible number of regiments involved, and what would be the results on the officer personnel both as regards the present and the future.

## **PEACE STRENGTH OF CAVALRY AND ITS RATIO TO INFANTRY.**

There has been a disposition on the part of some persons to claim that the present Cavalry force is sufficient for the country. Some have even claimed that we have more Cavalry than we should have, therein losing sight of the extreme difficulty and great delay involved in making volunteer Cavalry field-fit. The Knowland bill, which proposes six complete divisions, etc., for the mobile Regular Army, meets the approval of the Infantry and Field Artillery. That bill provides for six divisions of nine Infantry regiments each, two Field Artillery regiments, one Cavalry regiment, and certain technical troops, also one Cavalry division of nine regiments with horse artillery and certain technical troops.

It increases the Infantry by 24 regiments, doubles the Artillery, and leaves the Cavalry as at present. This bill, with its provisions, is cited to show the trend of thought in certain spheres.



The proportion of sabers to bayonets is in various countries fixed at about 125 to 1,000, and is based largely upon financial reasons. Barring expense, there is hardly any limit that should be set to the amount of Cavalry that countries should possess. Properly handled, Cavalry has by reason of its speed, mobility, and capacity to fight dismounted, great superiority. Bearing these facts in mind, it would seem that the bill above referred to should have for each infantry division a regiment as provided, and two independent divisions for the larger and more important rôles of independent Cavalry. In some countries, where Cavalry is not in sufficient numbers, provision is made for mounted Infantry, or the sending of Infantry in wagons or on bicycles to reinforce Cavalry at important points. In fact, in our country war effectiveness alone should determine the amount of independent Cavalry maintained.

The bill referred to relates solely to the regular establishment and makes provisions for a larger peace status than can be expected from Congress within the near future. In any event, in fixing the mobile forces of the United States the length of time required to make the various elements field fit, the present and expanded strength of the Organized Militia, and the probable number of volunteers called out must be given full consideration.

The following tables show the strength of Infantry and Cavalry of the several countries and the percentage of these two arms to the total peace strength:

Countries.	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Cavalry.
			<i>Per cent.</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>
France.....	379,640	75,510	59.77	11.89
Germany.....	404,765	73,368	63.81	11.56
Austria.....	194,123	47,541	59.34	14.51
Russia.....	580,000	115,000	48.33	9.58
England.....	151,261	20,716	59.21	8.10
Italy.....	167,000	24,000	57.90	8.32
Mexico.....	20,326	7,318	63.50	22.86
Japan.....	149,402	14,585	64.95	6.34
United States:				
Regulars.....	27,370	13,540	33.64	15.64
Organized Militia.....	97,035	4,167	81.09	3.48
Total.....	124,405	17,707	61.70	8.80



These data show that our Cavalry, both Regular and militia, is only 17,700, or 8.8 per cent of the whole. It is considerably less than in France, Germany, Austria, and Russia, and about equal to that of England and Italy.

The following gives the fighting strength of existing organizations of the various countries on mobilization:

Countries.	Infantry rifles.	Cavalry sabers.
France.....	618,450	66,750
Germany.....	633,000	76,500
Austria.....	420,300	37,800
Russia.....	973,152	111,825
England.....	135,020	15,000
Italy.....	300,000	20,880
Mexico.....	53,760	14,016
Japan.....	228,000	14,550
United States:		
Regulars.....	39,600	15,225
Organized militia.....	167,000	5,800
Total.....	206,600	21,025

This shows that our percentage of sabers to bayonets is less than that in France, Germany, Russia, and England. The ratio of sabers to bayonets in the United States should, for reasons stated above, be larger than in other countries. A ratio of only 150 sabers to 1,000 bayonets would necessitate an increase over our expanded strength (15,000 regulars, 6,000 militia) of approximately 10,000 sabers. It is an unfortunate fact that much of our militia Cavalry is far below a proper standard of efficiency, and in these estimates it is probably put too high.

The above data leave out of consideration the large Volunteer Army (at least 200,000) that would be organized at the beginning of a war. As it is not reasonable to believe that Cavalry organizations could be created as quickly or as effectively as Infantry ones, some additional peace Cavalry organizations should be reckoned on to supplement volunteer requirements.

In the Rebellion the proportion of Cavalry to Infantry was approximately as follows: 223 regiments to 980 regiments. Since the authorized Cavalry regiment was, by general orders, April 29, 1863, fixed at 1,244 and the Infantry regiment at 1,022,

the ratio of sabers to bayonets was as 1 to 3.62; in other words, 276 sabers to 1,000 bayonets (27.6 per cent).

In a reasonable consideration of our first line of Infantry (militia 145 and regulars 30), say 175 regiments (19 divisions—5 field armies), it is right to assign 19 Cavalry regiments as divisional Cavalry and to give to each two field armies at least an independent Cavalry division, say  $2\frac{1}{2}$  divisions—21 regiments.

Summing this up, we see that the first line would require for its 175 Infantry regiments 40 Cavalry regiments, instead of the 21 (15 regular and 6 militia) that we have. Estimating the Cavalry regiments at 1,200 and the Infantry regiments at 1,500, there results 183 sabers to 1,000 bayonets. Estimating the Cavalry regiments at 750, half the strength of infantry regiments, the proportion would be 114 sabers to 1,000 bayonets.



## CAVALRY DRILL REGULATIONS OF THE CIVIL WAR.

The accompanying plate shows the regimental formation and clearly indicates the organization that was used during the Civil War. Cook's Tactics with the single rank was tried out around Washington in the winter of 1861-2, but in the spring of 1862 the double-rank system was resumed and continued till the end of the struggle.

The first edition of Poinsett's Cavalry Tactics, "printed by order of the War Department," was published in Washington in 1841, the second and third in Philadelphia in 1855 and in 1862, respectively, and the fourth at the Government Printing Office in 1864. The following appears in all the editions:

### FORMATION OF A REGIMENT OF FIVE SQUADRONS IN ORDER OF BATTLE (OR IN LINE).

The squadrons of a regiment in order of battle are distinguished by the denomination of first, second, third, fourth, and fifth; they are formed on the same line, in the order of these numbers, commencing on the right, and with an interval of 12 paces.

This is the primitive and habitual order of the squadrons in regiments.

Each squadron is composed of four platoons, distinguished by the denomination of first, second, third, and fourth, commencing on the right.

The first and second platoons form the first division, the third and fourth form the second division.

The formation is in two ranks; the oldest soldiers in each platoon are placed in the front rank, and from right to left in each rank.

When the squadron is to be exercised, it is composed habitually of 48 files; consequently, each division is composed of 24 files, and each platoon of 12; if the squadron is increased to 64 files, the platoon is then divided into 2 sections; that on the right is the first, and that on the left the second.

That which is prescribed for the formation when mounted is applicable to the formation on foot.



# POSTS OF THE OFFICERS AND NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF THE FIELD AND STAFF OF A REGIMENT IN ORDER OF BATTLE.

(Plate 1.) The colonel 25 paces in front of the center of the regiment, having a chief bugler behind him.

The lieutenant colonel 12 paces in advance of the center of the right wing.

The major 12 paces in advance of the center of the left wing.

The colonel moves wherever his presence may be necessary.

The lieutenant colonel and major move wherever the colonel may think proper to direct them.

The adjutant on a line with the front rank, 2 paces from the right of the regiment.

\* \* \* \* \*

# POSTS OF THE OFFICERS AND NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF A SQUADRON IN LINE.

The captain commanding is posted at the center of the squadron, the croup of his horse 1 pace in front of the heads of the horses of the front rank.

The second captain 3 paces in rear of the center of the squadron. He is charged with the alignment of the rear rank and file closers.

The senior first lieutenant commands the first platoon; the other first lieutenant commands the fourth platoon.

The senior second lieutenant commands the second platoon; the other second lieutenant commands the third platoon.

Each of these officers is posted at the center of his platoon, with the croup of his horse 1 pace in front of the heads of the horses of the front rank.






## Article, 1.

### FORMATION OF A REGIMENT OF FIVE SQUADRONS IN ORDER OF BATTLE

#### Explanations of the Signs

- Ct Colonel
- LtC Lieutenant Col
- M Major
- A Adjutant
- QM Quarter Master
- S Surgeon
- AS Assistant Surgeon
- COC Captain Commanding
- SCC Second Captain
- L Lieutenant
- SL Second Lieutenant
- SM Sergeant Major
- QS Quarter Master Serg
- S Sergeant
- COC General Guide
- PM Principal Musician
- CB Chief Bugler
- SB Standard Bearer
- B Bugler
- C Corporal
- Men of the Front Rank
- Men of the Rear Rank





192 42